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Adam Smith's Unnaturally Natural (Yet Naturally Unnatural) Use of
the Word Natural
Natural and nature are complex words, fraught with ambiguity
and contradiction. This paper does not attempt to give a complete
account of Smith's use of these words. However, it does
demonstrate that Smith did not necessarily approve of what he
called "natural" or "nature". Economists and others who assume
otherwise are in error. A study, analysis, and/or interpretation
of Smith's work which depends upon this (at times unstated)
assumption - that Smith necessarily approved of "nature" or the
"natural"- needs to be read with great care; perhaps even
incredulity.1
The impression has been given by various knowledgeable
commentators of Adam Smith's work that Smith was unambiguously in
favor of (or normatively disposed towards) what Smith called
"natural" or "nature". So, for example, Patricia Werhane in a
recent extensive study of Smith's work writes that for Smith "a
society that emulates the system of natural liberty is most
harmonious e-.nd closest to the natural order1; hence, for Smith
"the natural order of society is the ideal moral order."-
Charles Clark, in a recent book lambasting "natural law
economics" for making economic thought ahistorical and asocial
writes that "Smith's work was Newtonian because that was the best
way of discovering the natural laws and God's design - the
natural order". For Smith "God implanted in our nature drives and
propensities which lead us to promote His end, which - since He
is a benevolent God - is the well-being of society." Clark
claims that for Smith "the basic idea behind the Invisible Hand
is one of the major themes of Natural Theology: nature is
arranged so as to provide for the prosperity and happiness of
mankind, as long as man followed nature's design, the natural
laws."3
Jacob Viner in his classic article "Adam Smith and Laissez
Faire" wrote that "Smith's major claim to fame ... seems to rest
on his elaborate and detailed application to the economic world
of the concept of a unified natural order, operating according to
natural law, and if left to its own course producing results
beneficial to mankind." Viner explicitly reads Smith as
associating the natural with good and the not natural with bad;
hence, "government activity is natural and therefore good where
it promotes the general welfare, and is an interference with
nature and therefore bad when it injures the general interests of
society."4
David McNally in a recent detailed reinterpretion of Adam
Smith and the classical political economists as exponents of a.
theory of "agrarian capitalism", argues that Smith "saw these
historical changes as creating a social relation (wage labour)
consistent with the natural order of things and thus as
indispensable to economic prosperity and social harmony".
McNally interprets Smith as having "naturalized and eternalized
historically specific relations of production", thus giving
Smith's work "its uncritical and apologetic character."5
These writers (as well as many others) have a tendency to
misunderstand Smith, and mislead their readers, because they are
insufficiently aware that Smith did not feel that what was
"natural" was necessarily desirable.6
This paper does not attempt a full analysis of Smith's
promiscuous relationship to the words "natural" and "nature".7
Yet, it will be here noted that "nature" and the "natural" is an
extraordinarily rich, complex, contradictory, no doubt
dialectical concept.8 C.S. Lewis in his Studies in Words says
that nature can mean, among other things, everything, or that
which is created by God, or that which is sublunary, or the
ordinary, or a thing's real character, or the actual, or the
real, or the pre-civil, or that which is not touched by divine
grace. Nature's opposite may be unnatural, artificial, not "Man",
not "rational" law, supernatural, or towns.9 Samuel Johnson's
dictionary contains ten definitions for "natural" as an adjective
and thirteen definitions for "nature".10 It takes over four
pages of small type for the Oxford Engliah Dictionary to define
"natural"; and over two pages to define "nature".11 It perhaps
should not be expected that Smith should be entirely consistent
in his use of such a pregnant term as nature or natural.12
Nonetheless, I will now give examples where Smith used the word
natural or nature to describe something which he clearly did not
approve of.
Let us begin with Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence.is In a
discussion of property rights, and means of acquiring property,
in this case property by accession, Smith says: "Among men too
the child is considered as the property of the mother unless
where she is the property of the husband, and then the offspring
belongs to the father as an accession to the wife. This was the
case in the old law in the state of wedlock and in this point is
still so, but natural children are the property of the mother and
generally take her name".14
A natural child was one born of unwed parents. Smith wished
to discourage the production of natural children.10
In lecturing on the transfer of property by succession, i.e.
from the dead to the living, Smith says: "Though when men get
the power of conveying an estate by a testament they are often
more willing to give their fortunes to those who are already
rich, as they are their more respectable relations, than to those
who are in lower circumstances. This perhaps is not altogether
just but it is what men are naturally inclined to."16
Note: here Smith makes an invidious comparison between what
is perhaps "altogether just" and that which men are "naturally"
inclined to do. Clearly, Smith does not necessarily favor what
men are "naturally" inclined to do.
In a discussion of earlier times. Smith describes how the
barbarous nations of the north overran the Roman Empire, the arts
were neglected, and a great share of power went into the hands of
those who possessed the greatest property. Smith says that in
his contemporary society "A tradesman to retain your custom may
perhaps vote for you in an election, but you need not expect that
he will attend you to battle."17 Things were different after the
fall of the Roman empire: "As the dependents were in every
respect so entirely maintained by these allodiall lords {as they
were called) for maintainance and every thing they enjoyed, it
was natural that they should attend him in war and defend him
when injured by the other lords or their dependents. And they
were constantly about him, whether in peace or in war; in peace
they were entertained at his table, and in war they were his
soldiers." ie
Smith is here describing a relationship which was
"natural"; yes, natural given the socioeconomic arrangements at
the time. Yet, note: this is exactly the type of "natural"
personal servile relationship which vexed Smith dearly.19 For
Smith, "Nothing tends so much to corrupt and enervate and debase
the mind as dependency, and nothing gives such noble and
generous notions of probity as freedom and independency."20
In discussing slavery Smith says: "It is to be observed that
slavery takes place in all societies at their beginning, and
proceeds from that tyrannic disposition which may almost be said
to be natural to mankind." 2i
For people who think that Smith was some kind of Panglossian
optimist, Smith's views on slavery make sobering reading. Smith
doubted that slavery would "ever be totally or generally
abolished."22 Smith says of slavery in a free country that "the
love of domination and authority and the pleasure men take in
having every thing done by their express orders, rather than to
condescend to bargain and treat with those whom they look upon as
their inferiors and are inclined to use in a haughty way; this
love of domination and tyrannizing, I say, will make it
impossible for the slaves in a free country ever to recover their
liberty." 23
A little later in discussing the situation of the coal
miners in his time, Smith says that it is in the narrow economic
interests of the masters of coal works to free their miners, who
are kept in virtual slavery. "[0]ne who works a year and day in
the coal pit becomes a slave as the rest and may ba claimed by
the owner, unless he has bargained not to take advantage of this.
But this the masters of coal works will never agree to. The love
of domination and authority over others, which I am afraid is
natural to mankind, a certain desire of having others below one,
and the pleasure it gives one to have some persons whom he can
order to do his work rather than be obliged to persuade others to
bargain with him, will for ever hinder this from taking
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Smith deeply desires a social system to be set up, which is
structured so that it minimizes the ability of the powerful to
use personal domination and authority over others and to
tyrannise their underlings. In the above particular situation,
if the superiors in question freed their coal miners, wages would
fall; coal owners in effect pay a premium so as to be able to
have the coal workers in slavery.26 Note how Smith wants to
develop social institutions to counteract a "natural" human
inclination: the love of personal domination and authority over
others.
In a similar vein concerning "natural" human passions which
are undesirable, Smith says: "Treasure and derelict goods by the
laws of Britain belong to the king. This arises from that
natural influence of superiors which draws every thing to itself
that it can without a violation of the most manifest rules of
justice."2e
This is reminiscent of a point Smith made on the proper
subjects of tragedies in his Lenturas on Rhetoric and Belles
Lettres. There Smith says that "There is in human nature a
servility which inclines us to adore our superiors and an
inhumanity which disposes us to contempt and trample under foot
our inferiors." 2T
Note how in the same sentence Smith attributes an inhumanity
to hnm^r^ nature.
In the "Early Draft of Part of The Wealth of Nations" Smith
writes of a "greediness which is natural to man'.-e Smith's use
of the word natural in connection with greediness (which Smith
does not approve of) occurs in the context of outlining how
political rulers seize all vacant lands as soon as the idea of
private property in land is introduced. This seizure inhibits
the slow progress of opulence; naturally, Smith denounces it.29
Returning to the Jurisprudence Lerrt.ur-e.s. Smith discusses
war between nations, and comments upon guilt by association: "We
have been injured by France, our resentment rises against the
whole nation instead of the government, and they, through a blind
indiecriminating faculty natural to mankind, become the objects
of an unreasonable resentment."30 Smith is against this
"unreasonable" resentment; it is "quite contrary to the rules of
justice observed with regard to our own subjects".31
Unfortunately, "in war there must always be the greatest
injustice but it is inevitable."32 Inevitable, perhaps; yet,
Smith clearly does not approve of this injustice which results
from a natural indiscriminating human faculty.
Smith discusses the development of money as a universal
equivalent. "In Italy, and particularly in Tuscany, every thing
was compared with sheep, as this was their principal commodity.
This is what may be called the naturq1 measure of value."33
Notice how a "natural" measure of value arose at a certain level
of socioeconomic development. Smith discusses how money developed
from cattle and oxen and sheep to the precious metals. Gold and
silver became the measure of value. "In the same manner as they
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changed the natural measures of length into artificial ones, so
did they those of value. All measures were originally taken
from the human body; a fathom was measured by the stretch of a
man's arms, a yard was the half of this, a span an inch or digit,
... These natural measures could not long satisfy them, as these
would vary greatly, ... Prudent men therefore contrived, and the
public established, artificial yards, fathoms, feet, inches, etc.
which should be the measures of all different lengths. For the
same reason they converted the original and natural measures of
value into others not so natural. but more convenient than any of
those naturally used by men in the ruder ages of society."34
Smith favored the development away from a more "natural"
measure of value to the precious metals. "The natural measures
of sheep or oxen would not answer their purpose; a more precise
measure was requisite, the value of which could always be
ascertained by its quantity."3& People became more careful in
their trades and "bargains"; the "natural" measure of value was
rightfully superseded. After all, as Smith patiently explains,
it would indeed be "a very great hardship on a Glasgow merchant
to give him a cow for one of his commodities."36
In the so-called "History of Astronomy" essay3"7 in a
discussion of the origin of philosophy Smith writes that "in the
first ages of society ... cowardice and pusillanimity, so natural
to man in his uncivilized state ... unprotected by the laws of
society, exposed, defenceless, he feels his weakness upon all
occasions; his strength and security upon none."38
For Smith, cowardice and pusillanimity are natural to man in
the early stages of 'society. W.P.D. Wightman, Smith's rather
quarrelsome modern editor of the majority of Smith's Eaaava on
Philosophical Sub.iecta^s writes that "Smith seems to have had an
obsession about "cowards'".40 Smith, of course, was against
cowardice and pusillanimity. One of his major concerns in the
Lectures on Jurisprudence was how to defend society.41 Smith
deals with this issue in T.ie Wealth of Nations, in Book V,
Chapter I, Part I, "Of the Expence of Defence". Here, among
other things Smith claims that "An industrious, and upon that
account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be
attacked; and unless the state takes some new measures for the
public defence, the natural habits of the people render them
altogether incapable of defending themselves."42 According to
Smith, due to the "natural' social habits engendered in a
commercial (or capitalist) society, the state of a. commercial
society must spend the money to maintain a standing army. In
this passage, coming as it does in the middle of a discussion
comparing the warlike qualities of people in hunting,
shepherding, farming and commercial societies, it is clear that
Smith is dealing with "natural habits" which are, indeed,
socially determined by the level of society. Moreover, Smith
does not entirely approve of all of these "natural habits". Some
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of these undesirable "natural habits' require the attention of
the state.
In the Wealth of Nations, in discussing the advantages of
the division of labor and specialization, Smith writes that "The
habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which
is naturally. or rather necessarily acquired by every country
workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every
half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almost
every day of his life; renders him almost always slothful and
lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even on the most
pressing occasions."'43
Naturally, Smith is against the sloth and laziness "natural"
to the country workman.
In discussing wages, Smith notes that "We rarely hear, it
has been said, of the combinations of masters ... because it is
the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which
nobody ever hears of."44 Smith was against combinations of
masters; he disapproved of this "natural state".
Smith writes that "entails are the natural consequences of
the law of primogeniture." 46 Primogenitor is the right of the
eldest child, especially the eldest son, to inherit the entire
estate of one or both parents; entails on land were rules by
which the inheritance to the land in future generations was
11
fixed. Smith was against both of then;.
In a chapter arguing against government deficit spending
Smith writes "In a commercial country abounding with every sort
of expensive luxury, the sovereign, in the same manner as almost
all the great proprietors in his dominions naturally spends a
great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries."-*6
Smith argued against this sort of "natural" profligate government
spending since, among other reasons, "The want of parsimony in
time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time
of war."4V
In a discussion of what Smith perceived to be a contemporary
stationary state, Smith writes that "China seems to have been
long stationary, and had probably long ago acquired that full
complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its
laws and institutions."48 Hence, human laws and institutions can
have a "nature"; and, Smith disapproved of some of those laws and
instutions. In particular, if China opened up more to foreign
commerce, and gave greater security to the poor and the owners of
small capital, then it could break out of the stationary state
and increase its wealth.
Right before explaining that "the mean rapacity, the
monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither
are, nor ought to be the rulers of mankind ... may very easily be
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prevented from disturbing the tranquility of any body but
themselves" .Smith comments that "the violence and injustice of
the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am
afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a
remedy."45 Here is a situation in which the "nature" of human
affairs can do little to remedy an ancient evil. Although the
word "evil" is one which has generally dropped out of 20th
century economists' discourse, 1 think it is clear enough that
Smith was against this sort .of "evil" engendered by the nature of
human affairs.
In Book IV, at the end of the long chapter "Of Colonies",
after a description castigating how the East India Company is
ruining India, Smith writes "I mean not, however, by any thing
which I have said, to throw any odious imputation upon the
general character of the servants of the East India company, and
much less upon that of any particular persons. It is the system
of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I
mean to censure; not the character of those who have acted on it.
They acted as their situation naturally directed, ..."Bo
Here the stewards in the East India company acted in a
"natural" way, based upon their position in a mercantile monopoly
which was also the sovereign of a country. Thia was a "natural"
way which Smith disapproved of. Smith disapproved of a monopoly
mercantile firm being the sovereign of a country and the
"natural" consequences which follow from it.
Smith returns to the theme of monopolies in Book V, and
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elaborates on how they attempt zo restrict output and increase
prices. "The usual corporation spirit, wherever the law does not
restrain it. prevails in all regulated companies. When they have
been allowed to act according to their natural genius, they have
always, in order to confine the competition to as small a number
of persons as possible, ... "el Attempts to restrict competition
is exactly the sort of "natural genius" which Smith most
vehemently attacked.
Later in the same article, near the end of a very long
paragraph outlining the disgraceful history of the English East
India company, Smith writes: "No other sovereigns ever were, or,
from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly
indifferent about the happiness or misery of their subjects, the
improvement or waste of their dominions, the glory or disgrace of
their administration; as, from irresistible moral causes, the
greater part of the proprietors of such a mercantile company are,
and necessarily must be."B2 These are the "nature of things",
the irresistible moral causes which result when a monopolist,
mercantile company is the sovereign of a country; Smith was
against this sort of nature.63
In the next article, in dealing with managerial problems in
controlling college professors, Smith argues that professors
should be at least partly paid for by the students themselves. If
professors are not, and they are responsible to authorities
outside of the university, such as a bishop or a governor or a
minister, there will be administrative difficulties. "An
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ext-ranecus jurisdiction of this kind, besides, is liable to be
exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature it is
arbitrary and discretionary, and the persons who exercise it,
neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves,
nor perhaps understanding the sciences which it is his business
to teach, are seldom capable of exercising it with judgment. ...
Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the
administration of a French university, must have had occasion to
remark the effects which naturally result from an arbitrary and
extraneous jurisdiction of this kind."54
Naturally, Smith is against authority which is of its nature
ignorant, arbitrary and capricious.es
Later in the same article, Smith deals with the deleterious
effects of the division of labor on the mind and character of the
worker in commercial (capitalist) society. According to Smith,
the worker "naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such
exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is
possible for a human creature to become." Be Smith is against
work-induced stupidity and ignorance which "naturally" arises
from the division of labor in commercial societies. Smith argues
that the government should use education to try to counteract
these undesirable "natural" traits.
15
Greater study and care needs to be devoted to how Smith uses
the words "natural" and "nature". These are complex words,
fraught with ambiguity- The present paper has proposed to
demonstrate that Smith did not necessarily approve of things
which he denoted as "natural" or "nature". Yet, the paper's
implications may possibly be farreaching. Economists and others
who assume that Smith necessarily approved of what is "natural"
or of "nature" are in error. A rereading of Smith with this
point in mind may be warranted.
16
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
History of Economics Society Meeting, June 2S-C9. 1993, Temple
University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I would like to thank
Jolane Solomon, Dirk Held, and Kenneth Bleeth for their help and
comments. Responsibility for errors and opinions is entirely
mine.
Endnotes
1- This paper is part of a series of papers I am working on
concerning Smith's methodology and world view. My reading of
Smith is that he is an epistemological sceptic; concerning human
nature he is an ontological pessimist; Smith did not
unambiguously believe in "progress" or that humans can approach
"truth": hence the importance of rhetoric in his thought; (see
e.g. Griswoldf1991)1 and, Smith's analyses were generally
historically specific' (see e.g. Eaci (1993); also Cramachi
(1981)). Smith's promiscuous use (by today's standards) of the
words nature and natural has tended to obscure the fact that his
analyses were neither asocial nor ahistorical; nor were they
uncritical of commercial or capitalist society.
2. Werhanef19911. pp. 82; 50, emhasis added.
3. Claxk., (1992) pp.42; 48, emphasis added. See also Clari,
(1989); (1990). That this seems to be an oversimplification of
Smith's theological views see e.g. Pack. 1992.
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(1923) pp. US; 141, emphasis a
5. McNallvf1938 i. p. 261 emphasis added. For interpretations
that Smith's work was neither apologetic nor uncritical see e.g.
Pothachild(1992i . EacJi (1991).
6. For other prominent examples of this problem see e.g.
Veblenf 194S i and daEK (1963) "Chapter 2, **1, "Seventh and Last
Observation".
7. The most profound reflections on the use of "nature" and
"natural" in Smith's work is perhaps Cremachi (1989). Cremachi
argues that Smith used "nature" and "natural" as a metaphysical
link between "reality" or "truth" which, following Hume, Smith
felt he was unable to know or appropriate or make "progress"
towards, and historic ism. Hence, talk of nature and the natural
provided Smith with a buffer or bridge between "the individual
mind and the ultimate order of reality", (p. 104) Indeed, it is
"true" that Smith rarely if ever talks of e.g. "the progress of
truth" (Stewart (1980), p. 327) or if something is truthful.
Smith does talk incessantly about the nature of a thing and if
something is natural.
8. See e.g. Eceiid (1963), "The Antithetical Sense of Primal
Words" pp. 44-50; Hegel (1967), "Perception: Or Things and Their
Deceptiveness", pp. 161-178. Indeed, if there is some sort of
dialectical unfolding of human history, or if there is any
"truth" to "Freudian slips" and Freud's concern that "we should
understand the language of dreams better and translate it more
easily if we knew more about the development of language"
13
i Fr^udi1963). p. 50) then they should be particularly reflected
in the history and development of the use of the words nature,
and natural, and their synonyms and antonyms. The proper
understanding of texts by economists could be enhanced by
attention to the field of historical linguistics. This field, of
course, was a keen interest of Smith's; see, e.g. "Considerations
Concerning the First Formation of Languages" in Smith (1983).
9. Lewis (1967), Chapter 2, "Nature (With Phusis, Kind, Physical
etc.)" pp. 24-74. Its opposite can also be revealed, as in
revealed theology.
10. Smith wrote an influential review of Johnson's dictionary
for the Edinburgh Review. See Smith (1980), pp. 229-241.
11. A few years ago I asked the curator of the Peabody Museum of
Natural History at Yale University to define "natural" for me.
He could not. I asked him then how he could decide what belonged
in a museum of natural history and what did not. His answer was
exceedingly complex; in fact, I was unable to decipher it.
12. For an example of, e.g.. Smith's rather loose translating
style, compare his translation of extracts from Rousseau's
Discours aur 1'origine et lea fondemens de 1'inepalite parmi les
homines with the original in Smith (1980) pp. 251-256.
P.UXQ (1992) gives examples of eight distinct usages of the
term "natural" in The Wealth qf Natjoris.
13. Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence. especially his more
recently discovered "Report of 1762-3" have not received the
attention they deserve from Smith scholars. These lectures
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reveal a deep historical depth to Smith, as well as an affinity
with Marx. See tlfisi (1977).
14. Smith (1978), p. 27, emphasis added.
15. See. e.g. ihiiU., PP. 447-443.
16. liiiiL., p. 40, emphasis added.
17. liiid^ , p. 50.
18. Ibid.. p. 51, emphasis added.
19. See e.g. Peralman (1989).
20. Smith (1978), p. 333.
21. Ibid., p 452, emphasis added.
22. IhiLU, p. 181.
23. Ih_ld_, p. 186.
24. Ibid., p- 192, emphasis added.
25. Ihid~
26. It}id. . p. 460, emphasis added.
27. Smith (1983), p. 124, emphasis added.
28. Smith (1978), p. 579, emphasis added.
29. It also introduces the concept of monopoly rent which
creates havoc with Smith's theory of price determination. See
Rieardn (1977), Dmitriev (1974).
30. Smith (1978), p. 547, emphasis added.
31. Ihid*
32. lhid~, p. 548.
33. Ijaid. , p. 499, emphasis added.
34. Ib_id. , pp. 367-368, emphasis added.
35. JJaid^ ., pp. 368-369, emphasis added.
3e . liiiii. . p. SCO.
37. This and the "History of the Ancient Physics" and the
'History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics" are each
preceded by the title "The Principles Which Lead and Direct
Philosophical Enquiries". Thus, each of these pieces appear to
be actually part of a larger, unified, unfinished essay of that
name. The traditional nomenclature emphasises viewing these
pieces as separate histories, rather than as pieces of a unitary
essay on methodology. This nomenclature has the tendency to
obscure the importance of these essays for understanding Smith's
methodology.
38. Smiii, (1980), p. 48, emphasis added.
39. "At this stage some readers may reasonably protest that it
is an editor's function at most to comment on the text and not to
argue with its author." fWiahtman (1980), p. 25.) Quite true.
40. Smith. (1980), p. 168, fn. 35.
41. Particularly calamitous in Smith's view is when a society
based upon an "earlier" or "more primitive" stage of development,
such as a shepherding society, overruns a more "advanced" or
"sophisticated" society such as one based upon farming or
commerce. Arguably, the importance of Smith's concern has been
highlighted in recent years by such events as the destruction
wrecked by the backwards Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea and the
contemporary so-called "ethnic cleansing" by the rude (primitive,
relatively undeveloped) Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina.
42. WJi V.i.a.15, emphasis added.
43. Ibid. . I.i.7, smphaaio' added.
44. Uiid.. , I.viii.13, emphasis added.
45. Ibid.. III.ii.E, emphasis added.
46. Ibid.. V.iii.3, emphasis added.
47. IMd- , V.iii.4.
48. Itid~, I,ix,15, emphasis added.
49. ibid., IV.iii.c.9, emphasis added.
50. Ibid.. IV.vii.c.107, emphasis added.
51. XJaid. , V.i.e.7, emphasis added.
52. ihijdU, -J. i.e. 26, emphasis added.
53. For someone who used Smith's name to argue in favor of
mercantile rule, see Stigler (1988). This truly disheartening
misuse of Smith's name by someone who clearly knew better, was
peddled to the apparently unsuspecting Philistines in the
National Association of Business Economists. As Galbraith (1992)
has pointed out, Smith was "deeply averse to joint stock
companies, now called corporations ... Modern advocates of free
enterprise would find Smith's attack on corporations deeply
disconcerting.", (pp. 99-100)
54. m. , V.l.f.9, emphasis added.
55. The accuracy of Smith's characterization of French
universities is not currently at issue.
56. W- , V.i.f.50, emphasis added.
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